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Nagel: Optimizing Legal Policy

OPTIMIZING LEGAL POLICY
STUART

S.

NAGEL*

Various scholars have written in recent years about the quantitative optimization of managerial decisions' and a few have dealt
with social decisions.2 It is the purpose of this article to offer an alternative quantitative method to the approaches given in those materials. This alternative method is designed to be particularly applicable to proposed legislation and, to a lesser extent, to judge-made law.
It emphasizes estimated correlation coefficients to determine the relation of policies to goals and paired comparisons to weight goals and
to determine the likelihood that a policy will be adopted. In order
to make the method simpler for the reader to perceive, elementary
algebraic symbols and dichotomous variables will be used throughout
the article. No knowledge beyond high school algebra will be presumed. Two previous studies provide lengthy specific applications of
many of the broader methods and concepts presented here.3

*B.S. 1957, LL.B. 1958, Ph.D. 1961, Northwestern University; Associate Professor
of Political Science, University of Illinois; Member of the Illinois Bar; Presently on
leave serving as an Assistant Counsel to the Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Committee on the Judiciary.
The author gratefully acknowledges the perceptive critique of this paper,
which was offered by Mary Ellen Caldwell, Layman Allen, and Myres McDougal of
the Yale Law School and Thomas Cowan of the Rutgers Law School.
1. See, e.g., CHURCHMAN, ACKOFF & ARNOFF, INTRODUCTION TO OPERATIONS
RESEARCH (1957); MILLER & STARR, EXECUTIVE DECISIONS AND OPERATIONS RESEARCH
(1960); SCIENTIFIC DECISION MAKING IN BUSINEss-READINGS

IN OPERATIONS RESEARCH

FOR NON-MATHEMATICIANS (Shuchman ed. 1963). Thomas Cowan has recently
called the attention of legal theorists to operations research materials. Cowan,
Decision Theory in Law, Science, and Technology, 17 RUTGERS L. REv. 499 (1963).
2. ARRow, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963); BRAITHWAITE,
THEORY OF GAMES AS A TOOL FOR THE MORAL PHILOSOPHER (1955); BRAYBROOKE &c
LINDBLOM, A STRATEGY OF DECISION - POLICY EVALUATION AS A SOCIAL PROCESS

(1963). Although the Braybrooke & Lindblom book is not quantitative, the authors
do recognize "the boundary between problems that can be solved by calculation
and those that must be treated by a strategy of multiple adjustment has thus
shifted. With the development of more and more sophisticated computer techniques, the boundary may be expected to go on shifting." Id. at 247. The policymaking scheme of this article mainly involves policies that promote a medium degree of change and are based on a medium degree of understanding. Id. at 78.
3. Nagel, Testing the Effects of Excluding Illegally Seized Evidence, 1965
Wis. L. REV. 283 (particularly Figure 1); Nagel, Simplified Bipartisan Computer
Redistricting, 17 STAN. L. REv. 863 (1965).
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Correlation Coefficients
The simplest policy problem merely involves attempting to determine whether a given policy or means to an end will increase or
decrease the presence of a given intermediate or ultimate goal. An
X can be used as a symbol for a policy, and a Y can be used as a
symbol for a goal. In terms of correlation coefficients, this problem
involves determining whether there is a positive (direct), negative
(inverse), or zero correlation between X and Y.
To determine the direction of the correlation between X and Y,
one can compare a group of geographical units or individuals who
have been subjected to X with a group of geographical units or individuals who have not been subjected to X or who have been subjected to less X. The first group can be referred to as group E for
experimental, and the second group as group C for control. The
geographical units can be communities, states, countries, or other
units, and the individuals can be businessmen, school children, taxpayers, or other individuals depending on whom the policy is supposed to affect. The entities may also be time periods or events some
of which had X present and some of which had X absent. If the
proportion of group E that is high on Y is a greater proportion than
the proportion of group C that is high on Y, then there is a positive
correlation between X and Y; and if all other things are temporarily
held equal or constant for the sake of discussion, then X should be
adopted. If the relative size of these proportions (that is, PE and PC)
is reversed, then there is a negative correlation between X and Y;
and X should be rejected. 4 The difference between these two proportions represents an approximate measure of the degree of correlation between X and Y. It is symbolized r and can range from -1.00
to 0 to ±1.00. The relationships discussed in this paragraph can
be shown in a four-cell table like Table I. 5
In correlating X and Y, one should try to have entities in group
E that are like the entities in group C with regard to any Z characteristics (that is, region, prosperity, or industrialism) that cause X
and also cause Y so as to eliminate the possibility of spurious correlation between X and Y. E and C, of course should be unlike on X

4. If Y can be measured in degrees rather than merely as high and low, then
one would determine whether the entities in the E group had a higher average Y
than the entities in the C group.

5. For further detail on gathering empirical data and correlating variables in
legal research see Nagel, Testing Empirical Generalizations in Legal Research, 15
J. LEGAL ED. 365 (1963) and the references cited therein.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol18/iss4/3

2

Nagel: Optimizing Legal Policy

1966]

OPTIMIZING LEGAL POLICY

Table I. Correlating Policy X with Goal Y (dichotomous variables)
Group C

Group E

-x

+x

+Y

N,

-Y

2

N 1 + N2

+

Ns

N, + N

N4
N3

+N

N entities

N,

Po= N1 / (NI + N2 )

r

PB = NS/ (N3 + N)

chi2

My = (NI -+ Ns)/N

Sy =- V (my) (I -HY-)

Mx = (N 3 + N 4)/N

Sx = V(Mx) (I - Mx)

=

PB - P
=

r2N

and the choosing of entities should be unrelated to how they are
positioned on Y. One can also apply (1) a chi-square test to determine
whether the r is big enough given the N to be considered not due to
chance and (2) a test of reasonableness in light of known relationships. A correlation coefficient can be thought of as being related to
the probability that X will achieve Y. It would, however, be erroneous to substitute P0 alone for r because P0 merely indicates the
probability of +Y occurring if +X occurs. PB does not indicate the
probability of ±-Y occurring even if -X occurs. The r takes both
PB and P0 into consideration. As an alternative to determining at
one point in time whether each entity in group E and group C was
high or low on Y, one can determine whether each entity in group E
and group C underwent a big or a little increase in Y after the
entities in E were subjected to X.
Relevant data can frequently be obtained from available records
or from questionnaires. Most X's and most Y's though cannot be
measured like physical or even monetary things can, but entities can at
least be positioned as having X or Y present or absent, as high or low,
or as more or less than some entity that is used as a standard. It may,
however, sometimes be impractical to calculate r because of lack of
available data, lack of time or money to obtain or simulate data, or because of the presence of an X variable that cannot be simulated and
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is practically unique in world history. In such a situation, one will
still gain insights into the relation between X and Y by attempting
to roughly estimate what PB and Pe might be or by attempting to
have others make such an estimation. The estimate may be based
on analogies, known relationships between other variables, knowledge of human nature, or an informed imagination. In making such
an estimate one can simplify the arithmetic by taking an N of 20
and estimating what quantity of the 20 are likely to be ±X and what
quantity are likely to be +Y and then estimating what quantity of
the -X entities are also likely to be --Y. Once these three estimates
are made, all the other values shown in Table I can be calculated by
simple arithmetic. One can assume that N 1 + N2 =N,
N 4 and
that N 1 + N 3 - N 2 + N 4 if no better estimate can be made. Where
policy decisions have to be made, a rough estimate of the relation
between X and Y may be better than no estimate and no decision.
Although an X having a calculated or estimated negative correlation with Y should generally be rejected, it may be wise to adopt X
if only a small negative correlation is involved and if there is more
to be lost by an error of rejecting an X that really had a positive
correlation with Y than by an error of adopting an X that really had
a negative correlation.
Regression Equations
Suppose one finds or estimates a positive correlation between
policy X1 and Y and also a positive correlation between policy X2
and Y and one has the resources to adopt both X1 and X 2, should he
then adopt both policies? Not necessarily. Such a pair of correlations
merely indicates X1 alone will increase Y, and X 2 alone will increase
Y. If the combined effect of X1 and X, does not produce sufficient
Y, then a policy of X 3 may have to be sought. On the other hand, if
policy X, alone or policy X2 alone can produce sufficient Y, then it
might be wasteful to adopt both policies. This problem involves
finding an equation that indicates how many units of X are needed
to produce a given quantity of Y.
Such an equation (called a regression equation) can be symbolized
as follows: Y = a + bX, where a is referred to as the a-coefficient
and b is referred to as the b-weight. The a can be calculated by the
formula, a = My -Mxb, where M- is the mean of Y and Mx is
the mean of X. The b can be calculated by the formula, b = r(Sy/Sx),
where Sy is the standard deviation of Y and Sx is the standard deviation of X. Simple formulas for calculating M's and S's for a fourcell table are given in Table I. Standard statistics textbooks give
more complex formulas for calculating M's, S's, and r where X and
Y have not both been dichotomized. In using the regression equation

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol18/iss4/3
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where Y has been dichotomized, simply substitute a 1 for ±Y and
solve for X. If X is also dichotomized, then an X value equal to or
greater than .5 equals +X and an X value less than .5 equals -X.
Likewise one could solve for Y by substituting a 1 or zero for X in
the equation. If r is positive, then +X will yield -Y; and if r is
negative, -X will yield +Y. Where X or Y are continuum variables
rather than dichotomies, more precise values than l's or zero's can be
substituted for X and Y and the regression analysis becomes more
worthwhile.
The regression equation given presupposes a roughly linear relationship between X and Y. In other words the more X one adopts,
the more Y one will get although additional units of X may not produce proportionately additional units of Y. In a completely curvilinear relationship, the more X one adopts the more Y one will get
up to a maximum point, and then additional units of X take away
units of Y rather than merely add smaller units of Y. At least a sixcell table like Table II is needed to reveal such a curvilinear correlation. If P2 is greater than P1 and greater than PS a curvilinear relation is present. The regression formula for such a hill-shaped relation is Y- = a + b, X + b2X 2. To calculate a, b1, and b2 requires
solving a system of three simultaneous equations. In a 3-by-2 table
like Table II, however, when an entity is in the first category on X,
one can predict P1 on Y; when an entity is in the second category on
X, one can predict P 2 on Y; and when an entity is in the third category, one can predict P, on Y. One can make similar predictions on
Y for each category of X regardless of the number of X categories so
long as Y is dichotomized. This gives the same prediction as the
6
regression equation does.
Table II. A Curvilinear Relation Between X and Y.
(P2 greater than P1 or P.)
low X

middle X

high X

+-Y

N1

N3

N.

-y

N2

N4

N6

P1 = N.1/ (N1 + N 2 ) - P2 -

6.

N 3/

(N

3

+ N 4) - P. = N,/ (N 5 + N.).

For further detail on linear and curvilinear regression with one or multiple
BLALOCK, SOCIAL STATISTICS 273-358 (1960); PETRS & VAN VOORHIS, STATISPROCEDURES AND THEIR MATHEMATICAL BASES 425-35 (1960).

X's see
TICAL
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Interpretation of the data in a table like Table I or II will inform
the policymaker whether adopting or adding to X will increase or
decrease Y. That would be an inductive approach. A deductive approach, on the other hand, involves deducing from a regression or
other equation whether or not X should be adopted. The equation
itself may be derived by induction from the analysis of data or by
deduction from related empirically-tested formulas, intuitively accepted axioms, or from definitions. If the regression equation involves a hill-shaped relation and both X and Y can be numerically
measured, then one can use simple calculus to determine the number
of units of X needed to reach a peak on Y before diminishing total
returns set in. To do so, one determines the derivative of Y with respect to X given the regression equation, replaces the derivative sign
with a zero, and then solves the resulting equation for X. This
would be one of the rare instances where calculus, as contrasted to
algebra or statistical analysis, has any direct value to legal research.7
MORE THAN ONE POLICY OR GOAL

Multiple Policies and One Goal
Suppose one wishes to compare two or more policies (X1 , X2, X3 ,
et cetera) that have been proposed for achieving desired goal Y. In
terms of correlation coefficients, the logical thing to do is to compare
the correlation coefficient (r) between X 1 and Y with the coefficient
between X2 and Y, and so on down to the coefficient between X. and
Y where X, is the last X. If other considerations are held constant,
then the X with the highest r is best, the X with the next highest r
is next best, and so on. X's with positive r's are worthy of adoption
assuming the X's are not mutually exclusive, and X's with negative
r's are not. As previously mentioned, if a certain correlation coefficient
cannot be calculated because of lack of data, it may be better to estimate it or have others who are knowledgeable estimate it than to
abandon the correlation approach. Regression equations can be calculated for multiple X's by a method analogous to the method described where one X was involved. The general regression formula is
Y = a + (bXl) + (b2X,) + . . . + (b,LXfl). Standard computer programs make such calculations relatively easy after the individuals,
geographical units, or other entities involved have been categorized
on the X and Y variables.
7. The derivative of a hill-shaped equation Y = a + b1 X + bX2 equals
b1 + 2b2 X. PROTTER & MORREY, COLLEGE CALCULUS WITH ANALYTIC GEOMETRY
126-27, 160 (1964). Thus when the derivative sign is replaced with a zero, the
X that will give a maximum Y equals -b/2b 2.
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Where there are a great many mutually exclusive X's, a computer
can also quickly determine the Y that all or many of the X's will
produce. Such a situation is involved in determining the optimum
policy for assigning counties or other geographical units to legislative
districts. The Y or Y's in redistricting are mainly equality and compactness. 8
One Policy and Multiple Goals
The problem is a little more complicated if one has many Y's in
mind and one wants to know whether or not to adopt policy X. If
all the Y's are equally worthy and nonduplicative, then in terms of
correlation coefficients, one would logically add the correlation coefficient between X and Y1 (symbolized ry12x) to ry x to ry3 x and
so on. If the sum of the r's is plus or positive and the other considerations are held constant, then X should be adopted because a
positive sum indicates that X correlates positively with the desired
goals more than it correlates negatively. If the sum of the r's is minus
or negative, then X should be rejected for the converse reason.
If, however, all the Y's are not equally valuable as is more likely
to be the case, then each ryx should be multiplied by the weight
(symbolized w) or relative worth of the X in the ryx before summing
the ryx's. How can one assign" weights to each goal? A simple and
meaningful method is the method of paired comparisons. To apply
this method, one pairs each goal with each other goal. If there are
N goals, then there are N (N - 1)/2 comparisons. In preparing the
list of pairs, every goal should appear sometimes on the left and sometimes on the right, and no goal should be involved in two successive
pairs. The list of pairs is then given to a group of legislators, philosophers, public opinion experts, or some segment of the public
depending on whose values one is interested in. Each person in this
group should indicate which goal he prefers in each pair or which
goal he thinks the public would prefer. A matrix is then prepared in
which one lists each goal along both the top and the side. The cells
in the matrix indicate the proportion of times the goal at the top
was chosen in preference to the goal at the side. The sum of these
proportions downward for each goal can represent the value points
or weight for each goal, or one can mathematically manipulate the
matrix to determine more precise value points and intervals between
goals. Paired comparison programs, as well as correlation and regression programs, are now available in various computer program
libraries. 9
8.

Nagel, Simplified Bipartisan Computer Redistricting,note 3 supra.

9.

STATISTICAL SERVICE UNIT OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, MANUAL OF COM-

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1966

7

Florida
Law Review,
18, Iss. 4 [1966],
3
LAWVol.
REVIEW
OF FLORIDA
UNIVERSITY
[Vol. Art.
XVIII
The number of comparisons becomes unwieldly if the number of
goals exceeds 10, but that is unlikely to occur in most policy problems.
If it does occur, then as an alternative to the paired comparisons
method, one can use the method of successive categories to weight
the goals. This method involves asking the evaluators to place a goal
in one of five or more categories such as (1) highly undesirable, (2)
mildly undesirable, (3) neither desirable nor undesirable, (4) mildly
desirable, (5) highly desirable. A matrix is then prepared with the
goals on the side and the successive categories on the top. The cells
in the matrix indicate the proportion of times the goal at the side
was placed in the category at the top. The matrix is then mathematically manipulated to assign each goal a definite weight.
Neither the paired comparisons method of weighting nor the successive categories method adequately indicates the degree of difference between the Y's if all the evaluators always prefer a certain Y
or always reject a certain Y, or if the evaluators always put a certain
Y in the highest category or always in the lowest category. This problem can be handled by increasing the number of categories or by
providing a thermometer-type rating scale on which the evaluators
can attempt to position the goals. Such ratings, however, can be
checked by each evaluator for consistency by seeing whether the combined weights of various preferred combinations total more than the
combined weights of Various nonpreferred combinations. The only
such comparisons worth making are those where the outcome is not
obvious on the basis of the ranks alone. For example, where there
are four separate, compatible goals rated in descending order Y 1, Y 2,
Y 3, and Y 4, which combination is more valued Y, or (Y2 + Y3 + Y 4);
(Y. + Y4) or (Y2 +Y 3 ); Y, or (Y2 + Y3); Y, or (Y, + Y,); or Y,
or (Y3 + Y4); Y, or (Y3 + Y 4)? If the sums of the weights are inconsistent with any of these value judgments, then the evaluator can
adjust the weights to conform with the judgments. The weights assigned by the evaluators to each Y can then be averaged to give
average weights for the group of evaluators.1
Multiple Policies and Multiple Goals
Suppose one wishes to compare two or more policies and he has
many goals in mind. This is the problem of multiple X's and mulPUTER

PROGRAMS FOR STATISTICAL

ANALYSIS

(1964)

[hereinafter cited as

SSU

MANUAL].

10. For further detail on the method of paired comparisons, successive categories, and other methods for preparing an evaluation or prediction scale see
GUILFORD, PSYCHOMETRIC METHODS 154-301 (2d ed. 1954). For alternative methods
not covered in GUILFORD see CHURCHMAN, ACKOFF & ARNOFF, op. cit. supra note 1,
at 136-54.
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tiple Y's simultaneously. The general formula for the relative utility
(symbolized U) of X1 or any X given any number of Y's is: Ux
-

1

+ (rw,, where r,, is a shortened way of
(rw,) + (r2w2)+
writing ry x (that is, the correlation between X, and Y,), and
n

1

w,, is a shortened way of writing wy

(that is, the weight of Y,,). Thus
n

if other considerations are held constant, then the X with the highest
U is best, the X with the next highest U is next best, and so on. X's
with positive U's are worthy of adoption, and X's with negative U's
are not. For example, if one is attempting to decide between X,
(which produces +Y, and -Y 2 ) as contrasted to X, (which produces
-- Y, and +Y2), then one should logically choose the X that produces
the Y with the greater w unless the correlations offset the difference
in w's. In other words, if only one X can be chosen, choose the X
with the greater U. If, however, the Ux is only Q times the value
of Ux
2

but one can obtain more than Q times as much X2 than he

can obtain X1, then one should choose the maximum X 2 obtainable
all other things held constant.
X, may have a higher U than X2 if the future is a period of +Z,
but a lower U than X, if the future is a period of -Z. If it is practically certain that the future will be -Z then X, is clearly better
than X 2. If, however, the estimated probability that +Z will occur
is P and the ratio (1 - P)/P is more than the ratio Ux /Ux , then
1

2

X 2 should be preferred. In other words, where the U of an X is contingent on the occurrence of some future condition, the U should be
multiplied by the probability of the condition occurring when comparing the U with the U's of other X's. If it is impossible to arrive
at a roughly meaningful probability that a crucial Z will occur, then
it is traditional to assume that Z has a .50 chance of occurring."
The utility score in the above formula is only a relative score. It
enables one to rank policy proposals in light of the goals of the
policymaker or interest group concerned. To determine the quantity
of goal achievement that a given set of policies will achieve when
one has a number of goals in mind, one can calculate the a-coefficient
and b-weights for a regression equation for each goal using the general regression formula previously given. Then substitute the quantity
or category of X,, X 2..... and X, to be adopted into each regression
equation, and solve for Y in each equation. The set of Y values obtained represents the total quantity of goal achievement predicted.
The separate Y values, however, cannot be added together since that
would involve adding different kinds of things together. On the other
hand, one can talk about maximizing the over-all goal (G) where G
11.

MiLLER & STARR, op. cit. supra note 1, at 79-100.
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equals the product of the Y values with each Y value raised to the
power of its weight. 12 In other words, G = (Y, ') (Y, 11).A correlation coefficient between a set of X's on the one hand and a set of Y's
on the other hand can be determined by a technique known as
"canonical correlation.""-3
To maximize Y (rather than obtain a specific Y) where there is
a linear relationship between X and Y, choose the maximum X
available. To maximize Y where there is a hill-shaped relationship
between X and Y, choose the X equal to -b,/2b 2 as previously
mentioned in note 7 supra. Where there is more than one X, the
optimum value for each X depends on the cost of one unit of X and
on the maximum amount of money available to achieve Y. Suppose
X, costs 10,000 dollars per unit, X, costs 20,000 dollars per unit, and
there is a maximum of approximately 500,000 dollars to spend in
order to achieve Y. In such a situation the optimizing problem becomes one of maximizing Y where Y = a + bX, + b2X 2 and where
10X + 20X2 is less than or equal to 500. If one has the data to
solve a, b, and b, in the regression equation, then this regression
equation and the above cost equation can be put into a programming
routine that will indicate the appropriate units of XI and the appropriate units of X 2 in order to maximize Y in light of these two
equations. 4 One might also wish to add an equation that X, be less
than or equal to -b,/2b2.
The regression equation would then be
Y = a + (bxX,) + (b2X2) + (b3X22 ) where the third and fourth
terms indicate X2 and Y have a hill-shaped relation.
Listing Policies and Goals
In order to make the analysis more meaningful where one is
working with more than one X, he should be careful to eliminate
from consideration those X's that are duplicative. A duplicative X is
one that represents basically the same thing as another X although
the two X's are described in different words. Likewise duplicative
Y's should be eliminated where one is working with more than one
Y. In instances where one can obtain or estimate a meaningful correlation coefficient for every X with every other X from tables like
Table I, one can put these coefficients into a correlation matrix and
12. Id. at 161-65. Where the weights are decimals, large numbers, or negative
numbers one can calculate such a G easier by the formula: Log G = (w, Log Y1)
+ (w2 Log Y 2) + " "" + (w. Log Y.). RICHARDSON, COLLEGE ALGEBRA 391-404 (1958).
18. TINTNER, ECONOMETRICS 114-21 (1952); SSU MANUAL.
14. See the linear programming routine described in the SSU MANUAL and
in KEMENY, SNELL & THOMPSON, INTRODUCTION TO FINITE MATHEMATICS 249-65
(1957).
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factor the matrix thereby giving a set of nonoverlapping X factors
smaller in quantity than the original X's. These X factors can then
be correlated with the Y's. Likewise one could conceivably reduce
the number of Y's and eliminate overlapping Y's by intercorrelating
each Y with each other Y and then factoring the resulting correlation
matrix.15 It is, however, generally easier and more meaningful to
reduce the X's and Y's by doing some hard thinking and rewording
with regard to the distinctiveness of each X from each other X and
each Y from each other Y. Careful thinking will also help to eliminate
impractical X's. It might also be noted that where there are multiple
X's, the b-weight for each X is generally computed in such a way as
to hold constant statistically the other X's. Thus where such bweights are available, they can be substituted for the r's and then the
proper U formula requires multiplication of powers rather than the
addition of products since the b's are not pure numbers like the r's. 16
The U formula under such circumstances becomes
10

Ux
1

-

'20

(b. 1) (b.2)

,t

(b. ).

In order to do a factor analysis or calculate a multiple regression
equation with b-weights that hold other X's constant, it is necessary
to correlate each X with each other X. Such correlations may also
be helpful by themselves in eliminating duplicate X's or Y's since
duplicates will have a correlation of approximately +1.00 with each
other although a perfect correlation may be due to causes other than
duplication. The correlation between two X's or two Y's that are
mutually exclusive is -1.00.
The correlation between two X's or
two Y's that are not duplicative or mutually exclusive can be calculated by gathering or estimating data for a table like Table I. If this
is impractical, it may be reasonable to say there is a zero correlation
between the X's or the Y's in which case P1 equals P.
In listing the goals involved, one should include possible side
effects, both desired and undesired, as well as intended goals. In the
calculations, however, side effects need not include effects of effects of
the policies otherwise the evaluation process might become unwieldy.
One of the Y goals should generally be low monetary cost, and the
relation between the X's and such a Y can be determined by accounting and budgeting techniques rather than by the gathering of behavioral data. For ease in handling, all goals should generally be
stated in an affirmative way so that -Y is what is desired and -Y is
what is not desired and all w's are thus positive. In wording the
goals, one should try to be as explicit as possible. A well-stated set
15. Factor analysis is discussed in FRUcHTER, INTRODUCTION TO FACTOR ANALYSIS
(1954) and is programmed in the SSU MANUAL.
16. See the references cited in note 12 supra.
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of goals should possibly consider the intensity sought, the coverage
over persons, and the coverage over time. There is, however, no
quantitative system for making a best list of goals as contrasted to
weighting the goals within a list or as contrasted to optimizing a set
of policies for achieving goals. One can, though, determine whether
a goal should be adopted if the goal is a policy toward a higher goal.
Ultimately, however, one has to resort to pure value judgments that
cannot be correlated with a higher goal when there is no higher goal
to use as a criterion. Likewise, although policies can be quantitatively tested and ranked, there is no quantitative method for generating policy ideas. Such ideas are largely dependent on awareness of
the relevant literature, on imaginative creativity, and on trial and
error.
THE PROBABILITY OF POLICY ADOPTION

Determining the probability (symbolized P) that a given policy
will be adopted is important because regardless whether the utility
of a given policy is positive, it would generally be wasteful of resources for an interest group outside or inside the membership of
a legislature or a judicial body to push the adoption of a policy that
has a low probability of being adopted, unless there is something to
be gained (such as publicity) even if the policy does not pass, or
unless the policy is being pushed with the intention of compromising
on a milder passable policy. 17 Likewise it is wasteful of the time,
money, and friendship resources of an interest group to push policy
X, thinking this is the best they could hope for when with just a
little extra effort they could have gained the adoption of both X,
and X 2, unless there is something to be gained by passing a weak
policy by a large majority (such as significantly increased enforcement
and compliance) rather than a stronger policy by a narrower majority. In this context P equals the proportion of the policymakers
that are likely to vote in favor of the X under consideration. If P is
considerably less than 51 per cent, it may as well be zero.
The logical ideal strategy for a policymaker or interest group seems
to be to push the policy or combination of policies that has the
greatest relative utility (U) or goal achievement (Y or G) to the
policymaker or the interest group involved, provided the policy has
at least a .51 probability of being adopted. In practice, a policy17. The U of an X does not equal Y times w times P because such a formula
falsely assumes that if YX /Yx
is greater than P, /PX , then X 1, which has a
1

2

2

1

highly unlikely chance of being adopted should be pushed in Congress or the
Supreme Court in preference to X 2, which has a good chance of being adopted.
Clearly a small Y achievement is better than none at all.
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maker may rationally push a desired policy for nonpublicity, nonbargaining motives even though it appears to have only a .40 probability of adoption in order to avoid an error of underestimation which
would result in a bill not being pushed which would have been
adopted. Likewise a policymaker may rationally push X1 and
not X1 plus X2 combined even-though X1 plus X 2 appears to have a
.60 probability (and both X's are desired by the policymaker) in
order to avoid an error of overestimation which could result in the
loss of both X1 and X 2.
How does one calculate the probability that a policy will be
adopted? A policy or policies can be given a probability score by
first putting it or them on a list along with policies that have been
recently adopted or rejected by the current legislature or court involved. The list can then be submitted in the form of paired comparisons (pairing each policy with each other policy) to a group of
persons who have some knowledge of the attitudes of the policymaking body. Each person should indicate which policy in each
pair would be more likely to be passed. Using the method of analysis
previously mentioned for paired comparisons, each policy can be
given an adoption score. To give the proposed policy a specific
probability, calculate the average of the per cent of favorable votes
favoring the policy immediately below and immediately above the
proposed policy on the adoption scale. If the number of paired
comparisons becomes unwieldy the method of successive categories
of adoption-probability previously mentioned can be used. If one
believes that he is an adequate legislative predictor or goal evaluator,
then he can assign rough adoption probabilities to the proposals and
weights or ranks to the goals without using the pairing or categories
method and without using other persons' judgments.
For example, if X has a paired-comparison adoption score of 4.9
and a bill with an adoption score of 4.4 was approved by the United
States Senate by a 55-to-45 vote (55 per cent favorable), and a bill
with an adoption score of 5.7 was approved by the United States
Senate by a 70 to 20 vote (79 per cent favorable), then one can say
that the probability of X passing is .67. Instead of simply averaging
.55 and .79 one could solve for P by interpolation where (P - .55)/
(.79 - .55) = (4.9 - 4.4)/ (5.7 - 4.4). A probability could be
similarly calculated for the House of Representatives, and then the
two probabilities could be averaged to give an over-all probability
of congressional adoption.
It would be less meaningful to attempt to arrive at a probability
of adoption by analyzing the correlation coefficients between the
presence or absence of certain factual elements surrounding the policy
and the occurrence or nonoccurrence of adoption using past policy
proposals as entities. Such an approach, although possibly useful in
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predicting adjudication outcomes, does not adequately consider (1)
the significant effects of changes in policymaking personnel as contrasted to policy-applying personnel, (2) the relative uniqueness of
policymaking proposals as contrasted to case adjudications, and (3)
the insights of knowledgeable persons. Likewise any method that attempts to position the attitude of each individual policymaker in a
535-man legislature would probably be too unfeasible to be useful,
although sometimes an inside political leader can make an accurate
pre-vote survey of nearly all the members of a legislature.
There is no necessary relation between the utility of a policy and
its probability of adoption if utility is determined in terms of the
values of specific policymakers or interest groups. If, however, a
policy has a high utility in terms of the values of the general public
and the policymakers are aware of this utility, then, in a democratic
society, in the long run the policy will probably be adopted. In the
short run though, there may be a big difference between general
utility and adoption probability given such institutions as the
gerrymander, filibuster, rules committee veto, and Negro voter deprivation as well as lack of accurate information on relations between
policies and goals.
CONCLUSIONS

The key principles in this optimizing scheme in abbreviated form
are: (1) the relative utility of a policy proposal equals the sum of the
correlation-weights for each goal relevant to the policy; (2) the goal
achievement of a set of policy proposals equals the sum of the acoefficient and the b-weights times the X values for each policy; and
(3) the policy or combination of policies that should be pushed is
the one that has the greatest relative utility or goal achievement
with the general proviso that the policy have approximately a .51
probability of being adopted. The most important formulas are
thus: Ux =
1

Y

(rw,) + (r2w 2) +

a -- (b.X 1 )

+ (r,w,); and
+ (b 2X 2) ±+... + (bX,,).
...

The method presented for optimizing legal policy is definitely
not meant to be one that can always be applied. It is meant to be
a method of thinking whose application is possibly worth striving
for wherever it can be applied in part or in whole, even if some of
the components have to be estimated rather than calculated precisely. The method presented is also hopefully meant to stimulate
further analysis of the applications of operations research and statistical analysis to optimizing legal policy.
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